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grant or deny a motion to suppress unless it is clearly 
erroneous. Further, the trial court's finding is clearly 
erroneous only if it is against the clear weight of the evidence 
or if the appellate court reaches a definite and firm conviction 
that a mistake has been made. State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 
882 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
3. Did the lower court properly admit photographs and 
physical objects into evidence? The decision to admit evidence 
is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court and 
will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of that discretion and 
a determination by the appellate court that the challenged 
evidence prejudiced the defendant. See State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 
439, 474 (Utah 1988); State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1257 
(Utah 1988), on reconsideration, 776 P.2d 631 (1989). 
4. Was the evidence sufficient to convict defendant 
of second degree murder? An appellate court views the evidence 
in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, and will 
overturn the conviction only if the evidence, so viewed, is 
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that 
the defendant committed the crime for which he was convicted. 
State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985). 
5. Did the lower court properly deny defendant's 
motion for the jury to view the crime scene? The decision to 
grant or deny a motion for the jury to view the crime scene is a 
matter within the sound discretion of the trial court and will 
not be reversed absent a clear abuse of that discretion. See 
State v. Roedl, 107 Utah 538, 155 P.2d 741, 746 (1945). 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Case No. 900297-CA 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
BILLY CAYER, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction of murder in the 
second degree, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-5-203 (Supp. 1989), after a jury trial in the Third 
Judicial District Court. This Court has jurisdiction to hear 
this appeal which has been poured over from the Utah Supreme 
Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (Supp. 1990). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Did the lower court properly deny defendant's 
motion for a change of venue? The decision to grant or deny a 
motion for a change of venue is a matter within the sound 
discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed absent a 
clear abuse of that discretion. State v. James, 767 P.2d 549, 
551 (Utah 1989). 
2. Did the lower court properly deny defendant's 
motion to suppress evidence? An appellate court will not disturb 
the trial court's factual evaluation underlying its decision to 
Utah R. Crim. P. 29(e)s 
(e)(i) If the prosecution or a defendant in a 
criminal action believes that a fair and 
impartial trial cannot be had in the 
jurisdiction where the action is pending, 
either may, by motion, supported by an 
affidavit setting forth facts, ask to have 
the trial of the case transferred to another 
jurisdiction. 
(ii) If the court is satisfied that the 
representations made in the affidavit are 
true and justify transfer of the case, the 
court shall enter an order for the removal of 
the case to the court of another jurisdiction 
free from the objection and all records; 
pertaining to the case shall be transferred 
forthwith to the court in the other county. 
If the court is not satisfied that the 
representations so made justify transfer of 
the case, the court shall either enter an 
order denying the transfer or order a formal 
hearing in court to resolve the matter and 
receive further evidence with respect to the 
alleged prejudice. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with murder in the second degree, 
a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 
(Supp. 1989) (R. 2-5). Defendant was convicted as charged after 
a jury trial on February 26-28, 1990 in the First Judicial 
District Court, the Honorable F. L. Gunnell, Judge, presiding (R. 
388-91, 471-73). Judge Gunnell sentenced defendant to serve a 
term of five years to life in the Utah State Prison (R. 471-73; 
T3. 98J.1 
The record on appeal has been designated MR." Because the 
trial transcripts have been separately paginated, the transcript 
for February 26, 1990 has been designated "T1.M, the transcript 
for February 27, 1990 has been designated ,,T2.", the transcript 
for February 28, 1990 has been designated nT3.n,and the 
transcript from the suppression hearing has been designated "S." 
6. Did the lower court properly deny defendant's 
motion to accompany defense counsel to the crime scene? When a 
defendant fails to support his argument with any legal analysis 
or authority, an appellate court will decline to rule on it. 
State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Utah R. Evid. 103s 
(a) Effect of erroneous ruling. Error may 
not be predicated upon a ruling which admits 
or excludes evidence unless a substantial 
right of the party is affected, and 
(1) Objection. In case the ruling is 
one admitting evidence, a timely objection or 
motion to strike appears of record, stating 
the specific ground of objection, if the 
specific ground was not apparent from the 
context[.] 
Utah R. Evid. 403s 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded 
if its probative value is sufficiently 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, or misleading the 
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, 
waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 17 (i)s 
When in the opinion of the court it is proper 
for the jury to view the place in which the 
offense is alleged to have been committed, or 
in which any other material fact occurred, it 
may order them to be conducted in a body 
under the charge of an officer to the place, 
which shall be shown to them by some person 
appointed by the court for that purpose. The 
officer shall be sworn that while the jury 
are thus conducted, he will suffer no person 
other than the person so appointed to speak 
to them nor to do so himself on any subject 
connected with the trial and to return them 
into court without unnecessary delay or at a 
specified time. 
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hasty exit from the trailer (Tl. 147). Back at his trailer, 
Apodaca told Ramirez what had happened and started changing his 
clothes so that he could leave the camp before someone hit him 
again (Tl. 147-48) . 
While Apodaca was changing clothes, defendant, Brown, 
Cabututan, and Cummins barged into trailer #2 (Tl. 148-49, 150). 
Ramirez positioned himself between Apodaca and the four 
intruders. At some point, both Brown and Ramirez displayed 
knives and Cummins shouted for the others to disarm Ramirez (Tl. 
152, 190). Brown was nearest to Ramirez (Tl. 153). Brown told 
Ramirez to drop his knife and promised to put his knife away if 
Ramirez did also (Tl. 153, 190). After a few minutes, Ramirez 
dropped his knife. (Id.) After Brown put his knife away, Brown, 
Cabututan and Cummins rushed Ramirez out of the trailer (Tl. 154, 
155, 191). Defendant remained in the trailer (Tl. 155). 
Inside the trailer, Apodaca could hear Ramirez being 
beaten. (Tl. 155, 173, 192). As Apodaca continued to attempt to 
dress, defendant struck him (Tl. 156). Apodaca stayed in the 
trailer both because of defendant's presence and because his 
pants were only halfway up (Tl. 193). Defendant appeared more 
intoxicated than the others (Tl. 183). 
Still dazed by the blow from the sharpening stone, 
Apodaca remembered defendant hitting him at least twice in the 
fifteen minutes to half an hour they were in the trailer together 
(Tl. 157, 158). Apodaca repeatedly pushed defendant off of him 
(Tl. 194). The physician who subsequently treat€>d Apodaca, Dr. 
Rodney Merrill, testified that Apodaca's injuries could cause 
both disorientation and memory loss (T2. 178). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Western Brine Shrimp Company collects brine shrimp eggs 
from the waters of the Great Salt Lake (Tl. 122-23; T2. 195). 
The company operates a camp near the shore of the Great Salt Lake 
with several trailers for its employees (Tl. 120-21; T2. 27). 
The camp is located near Lakeside, Utah on the western side of 
the lake (Tl. 119-20; T2. 23-24; S. 10). There are no telephones 
at the camp, although they have ground-to-ground and ground-to-
air radios (T2. 24). 
On October 25, 1989, at approximately 9:45 p.m., 
William Cummins approached trailer #2 occupied by Mike Ramirez 
2 
and Eddie Apodaca (Tl. 137). Cummins wanted Apodaca to come to 
trailer #3 with him (Tl. 138). Because Cummins was acting 
hostile, Ramirez offered Apodaca a hunting knife to take with him 
(Tl. 138-39, 184). Apodaca declined to take it (Tl. 138, 184). 
When Apodaca arrived at trailer #3, the four occupants 
wanted to know why Apodaca had told Don Brown that he was the 
foreman of the camp (Tl. 143-44). Cabututan also asked Apodaca 
why he was not doing his share of the work, which evidently 
affected their bonus (Tl. 140, 144). The conversation became 
unfriendly (Tl. 144). 
Cabututan attacked Apodaca knocking him onto a bunk, 
then hit him on the left side of the head with a sharpening stone 
(Tl. 145-46). As Cabututan reached for a broom, Apodaca made a 
2 
For trial purposes, the trailers were arbitrarily numbered 1, 
2, 3, and 4. Mike Ramirez and Eddie Apodaca occupied Trailer #2. 
Defendant, Don Brown, Ray Cabututan, and William Cummins occupied 
trailer #3. Three other co-workers occupied trailer #1 (Tl. 126, 
T2. 26). 
Ramirez's legs and feet kicking him (T2. 39, 69, 81). Tilley 
could only remember three people around Ramirez, but specifically 
remembered defendant kneeling beside the upper part of Ramirez's 
body (T2. 111-12, 133). After Brown threatened .Anderson with a 
crescent wrench, Anderson stepped back into the trailer (T2. 38, 
41). 
Anderson continued to hear the beating going on outside 
(T2. 44). When he looked out a trailer window, Anderson saw 
Brown, Cabututan, and Cummins standing around Ramirez, but not 
defendant (T2. 44, 79). The three continued to beat Ramirez (T2. 
45). Anderson and his trailer-mates considered trying to break 
up the fight, but were concerned that defendant might be just 
outside the door (T2. 47). The fight continued for about 45 
minutes to an hour (T2. 48). When Ramirez would attempt to get 
up, Brown, Cabututan, and Cummins would beat him back to the 
ground (T2. 51-52). 
During the fight, Cabututan swung a knife at Sherman 
Gallardo when Gallardo verbally attempted to prevent Cabututan 
from stabbing Ramirez (T2. 52, 54). Anderson saw Cabututan hit 
Ramirez two or three times with a crescent wrench (T2. 53, 76). 
Anderson also saw Brown kick Ramirez and saw Cummins choke him 
(T3. 76-77). Throughout the attack, Ramirez pled with his 
attackers to stop (T2. 55). 
At one point, Cummins exclaimed, "He's not breathing." 
(T2. 55-56). Brown replied, "Oh, well, things like that happen, 
he's just a spick." Jd. When Ramirez did not move for a while, 
Brown, Cabututan, and Cummins returned to their trailer (T2. 56). 
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During the altercation between Apodaca and defendant, 
Cabututan returned to the trailer and retrieved Ramirez's knife 
(Tl. 159). Apodaca believed he was next (Tl. 201). Ultimately, 
Brown entered the trailer and told defendant to leave Apodaca 
alone (Tl. 160). Defendant stopped hitting at Apodaca. (Id.) 
Brown told Apodaca to gather what he could carry and to leave the 
camp. (Id.) Apodaca finished dressing and left the trailer. 
(Id.) As he came out the door, Apodaca saw Ramirez on the ground 
where Cabututan and Cummins were kicking him (Tl. 161-62). 
As Apodaca started to run, Cummins asked him if he was 
going to help Ramirez (Tl. 163). When Apodaca turned, Cummins 
hit him with his fist, knocking Apodaca to the ground (Tl. 164, 
165). Apodaca jumped up and found himself between Cabututan and 
Cummins (Tl. 165, 197). Cabututan swung a crescent wrench at 
Apodaca (Tl. 166). Apodaca ran away from the camp (Tl. 166, 
170). When Apodaca turned back to look at the camp, he could see 
at least two people kicking Ramirez (Tl. 170). 
At approximately 10:30 p.m., a noise outside woke 
Richard Anderson and Eric Tilley, Western Brine Shrimp employees 
and occupants of trailer #1 (T2. 30, 35, 106). Anderson heard 
thumping noises (T2. 35-36). Tilley heard up to four voices, 
each telling Ramirez they were going to kill him (T2. 106). 
Tilley grabbed a steak knife for his own protection (T2. 107). 
When Anderson opened the door to the trailer, he saw 
defendant, Brown, Cabututan, and Cummins standing around Ramirez 
(T2. 38-39, 69). The four assailants were kicking and hitting 
Ramirez (T2. 41, 69, 81-82). Defendant was standing around 
Defendant's shoes were seized directly from his feet 
prior to his transportation to jail (T2. 217-18). The shoes were 
stained with blood. (Id.) 
Dr. Todd C. Gray, the chief medical examiner for the 
State of Utah, performed the autopsy (T2. 145). Dr. Gray's 
external examination of Ramirez's body showed large amounts of 
scraping and bruising above and over the right eye, on the nose, 
and on the left side of Ramirez's face (T2. 148). Ramirez also 
had a left cheek injury and a scalp laceration consistent with 
being hit by a crescent wrench (T2. 149-50). Ramirez's lips had 
scrapings and abrasions which could have been caused by being 
kicked, or hit with fists (T2. 150). Ramirez's right eye had an 
opacified cornea, indicating blindness in that eye, and both eyes 
had pinpoint hemorrhages, possibly caused by strangulation (T2. 
151-52). 
Ramirez's neck, back, and upper extremities had 
evidence of bruising and scraping, which could have been caused 
by strangulation or being kicked or hit in the neck (T2. 152-53, 
154). Ramirez's chest, thigh, and the back of his left forearm 
had sharp force wounds, possibly caused by a knife (T2. 153, 
154). All of Ramirez's wounds were contemporaneous, except for 
three or four injuries which appeared older than the others (T2. 
155). Ramirez had 20 individual rib fractures consistent with 
being kicked or struck (T2. 160-61). Dr. Gray stopped counting 
the wounds at 70, concluding that Ramirez died from the 
cumulative effect of multiple blunt force injuries (T2. 155, 157-
58). Specifically, the injuries caused cerebral edema, a build 
Ramirez got up, walked to a water barrel, drank some water, then 
returned to his trailer to clean himself up (T2. 56-57, 77, 113, 
136). 
At 5:00 a.m., Ramirez knocked on the door of trailer #1 
(T2. 59, 78). He complained he could not breathe, asked for some 
water, and requested that someone call "911" (T2. 59-60, 79). 
Ramirez drank the water and fell over backward, dead (T2. 60, 
79). 
Anderson and Gallardo drove to Lakeside where they 
called the owner of Western Brine Shrimp and the Box Elder County 
Sheriff (T2. 60, 62). On the way back to the camp, they picked 
up Apodaca, evidently still suffering from a head wound (T2. 63-
64). 
Deputy Lynn Yeates of the Box Elder County Sheriff's 
Office arrived at the crime scene (T2. 182). From outside the 
door of trailer #3, Yeates observed tennis shoes, hip waders, and 
a box, all of which appeared to have blood on them (S. 75-76; T2. 
215-16, 222-23, 225-26). When defendant requested Yeates to 
retrieve some hay fever medicine from trailer #3, Yeates entered 
the trailer and saw a wet crescent wrench next to the sink (S. 
76; T2. 189). Later, Yeates seized these items (S. 77). Yeates 
also seized a knife he had observed in plain view inside trailer 
#3 (S. 80-82; T2. 229-30, 244-45). In addition, Deputy Dale Ward 
entered trailer #3 to retrieve cigarettes at the request of the 
trailer occupants (S. 28). Ward also noticed the box, the tennis 
shoes, and the crescent wrench in plain view (S. 30, 31-32). 
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Sufficient evidence existed to convict defendant of 
murder in the second degree. The State presented evidence that 
defendant aided his confederates by keeping the victim's friend 
inside the trailer to prevent the friend from coming to the 
victim's aid. Other evidence placed defendant next to the 
victims prostrate body, kicking him, and kneeling beside the 
body, from which a reasonable jury could conclude defendant 
participated in the victim's beating, particularly since there 
was blood on defendant's boots. 
Defendant has not demonstrated how he was prejudiced by 
the refusal of the lower court to allow the jury to view the 
crime scene. However, the jury had a diagram of the crime scene, 
photographic evidence, and other physical evidence to aid them in 
their deliberations. 
Defendant provides no legal analysis or authority for 
his claim that he should have been allowed to visit the crime 
scene with counsel. Thus, this Court should summarily reject the 
claim. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S 
REQUEST FOR A CHANGE OF VENUE. 
Defendant argues that because Box Elder County has a 
small population and because of the notoriety of the crime, the 
trial court committed reversible error by not granting a change 
of venue. Defendant's claim must fail. 
Rule 29(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
provides the mechanism in Utah for a change of venue: 
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up of fluid on the brain (T2. 158, 162). Cerebral edema is not 
immediate, nor is it painful in and of itself (T2. 164). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant was not prejudiced by the failure to change 
venue. Following the legal standard set by the Utah Supreme 
Court, the circumstances did not warrant a change of venue. 
Defendant merely cites the population of the county to argue the 
county is too small, ignoring the other factors cited by the Utah 
Supreme Court. While defendant argues that tremendous pretrial 
publicity occurred, none of the news articles in the record imply 
defendant's guilt. Defendant passed the potential jury for 
cause. He cannot and does not claim that the jury was prejudiced 
against him. 
The lower court properly denied defendant's motion to 
suppress since defendant lacked standing to challenge the 
seizure. Defendant has not claimed a possessory or privacy 
interest in any of the items seized. Additionally, the items 
were seized in a "common area" of the trailer, not areas where 
defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy. The items 
seized were in plain view, from a lawful vantage point, and the 
evidentiary characteristics of the items were immediately 
apparent. 
The photographs and physical evidence were properly 
admitted at trial. Defendant did not preserve this issue for 
appeal since there was no pretrial hearing to suppress and 
defendant did not object to the exhibits at trial. Additionally, 
the evidence was not so prejudicial as to outweigh its probative 
value. 
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" [e]vidence of the pervasiveness of the pretrial publicity is not 
enough to answer the question of whether the jury was fair and 
impartial." Lafferty# 749 P.2d at 1250. As the Bishop court 
noted, "The test is whether any jurors were prejudiced against 
the defendant." Bishop, 753 P.2d at 459. Defendant has claimed 
no prejudice and makes no claim that the jury was biased against 
him. Defendant merely refers to the fact that some jurors had 
knowledge about the case (Brief of App. at 9). That, in itself, 
is not enough. Jurors need not be ignorant of the facts of a 
case. Irvin v. Dowd# 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961). Indeed, defendant 
passed the jury for cause at the end of the jury voir dire (Tl. 
67). 
An examination of the record shows that Judge Gunnel1 
conducted an exhaustive voir dire (Tl. 10-67). At one point, the 
judge addressed the jury as follows: 
Now this case has generated quite a bit 
of publicity. And there have been previous 
trials that are related to this case. And I 
don't want to create a problem with the 
questions that I ask, but there has been a 
lot of publicity. 
Now, have any of you any knowledge of 
the facts involved, or have you formed or 
expressed an opinion with respect to the 
facts, either founded upon public rumor, 
newspaper, or common notoriety? Any of you 
formed an opinion or come a conclusion 
already because of anything that you have 
heard or read or someone has told you about 
this case? 
3 (Tl. 29). No response was given. Since defendant has neither 
demonstrated nor suffered prejudice, this Court should summarily 
Several potential jurors later disclosed in voir dire some 
exposure to pretrial publicity (Tl. 60-67). However, as 
previously noted, defendant passed the jury for cause (Tl. 67). 
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(e)(i) If the prosecution or a defendant in 
a criminal action believes that a fair and 
impartial trial cannot be had in the 
jurisdiction where the action is pending, 
either may, by motion, supported by an 
affidavit setting forth facts, ask to have 
the trial of the case transferred to another 
jurisdiction. 
(ii) If the court is satisfied that the 
representations made in the affidavit are 
true and justify transfer of the case, the 
court shall enter an order for the removal of 
the case to the court of another jurisdiction 
free from the objection and all records 
pertaining to the case shall be transferred 
forthwith to the court in the other county. 
If the court is not satisfied that the 
representations so made justify transfer of 
the case, the court shall either enter an 
order denying the transfer or order a formal 
hearing in court to resolve the matter and 
receive further evidence with respect to the 
alleged prejudice. 
Id. In State v. James, 767 P.2d 549 (Utah 1989), the Utah 
Supreme Court discussed four factors a trial court should 
consider in deciding whether to order a change of venue: (1) the 
standing of the accused and victim in the community; (2) the size 
of the community; (3) the nature and gravity of the offense; and 
(4) the nature and extent of the publicity. Icl. at 552. 
However, for a defendant to prevail on appeal, he must show 
actual prejudice from the pretrial publicity. State v. Bishop, 
753 P.2d 439, 458-59 (Utah 1988). The ultimate test is whether 
the defendant was tried by a fair and impartial jury. State v. 
Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1250 (Utah 1988), on reconsideration, 
776 P.2d 631 (1989). 
A. DEFENDANT WAS NOT PREJUDICED. 
In his brief on appeal, defendant relies on the James 
standard, while ignoring Bishop and Lafferty. However, 
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county, but also the amount of community involvement. Unlike 
James, there was no widespread community effort in defendant's 
case. Since the murder occurred in a desolate area and defendant 
was arrested the next day, there was no opportunity for fund 
raising, poster printing, or any of the myriad of other 
activities present in James. Aside from reading about the case 
in the newspaper, residents of Box Elder County were not 
involved. 
The third factor is the nature and gravity of the 
offense. James, 767 P.2d at 552. As previously expressed, the 
State does not equate the killing in the present case with the 
crime of infanticide which occurred in James. It also should be 
noted that the defendant in James was charged with capital 
homicide, as opposed to murder in the second degree in the 
instant case. Jd. at 553. 
The final factor is the nature and extent of publicity. 
James, 767 P.2d at 552. Defendant argues that because the case 
had notoriety and generated numerous newspapers articles and 
television stories, this case is similar to James. However, the 
James court focused on the media's portrayal of the defendant as 
the culprit who denied involvement. Id., at 554. In the instant 
case, all articles submitted appear to be nothing more than 
straightforward news articles, not having the inflammatory 
content found troubling in James (R. 347-87). 
The James court also observed that that case had not 
yet been tried, so the defendant had not yet been prejudiced. 
Id. at 555. Since the totality of the circumstances do not 
indicate the same type of prejudice to defendant as found in 
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reject his claim. 
B. NO ABUSE OF DISCRETION OCCURRED. 
In any event, an application of the James standard 
shows that defendant's claim must fail when the facts of this 
case are compared to the facts in James. The first factor is the 
standing of the accused and the victim in the community. James, 
767 P.2d at 552. In James, the accused had lived in the 
community for only two weeks prior to the disappearance of his 
three-month-old son. j[d. There were reports the accused had 
used drugs and had a lifestyle different from that of the 
community. .Id. In the instant case, defendant was from 
Louisiana and worked in a desolate section of Box Elder County. 
While defendant's standing in the community was not dissimilar to 
the defendant in James, the victim's standing is quite different. 
Defendant's victim was an adult, not a child, thus not creating 
the type of community revulsion inherent in the murder of 
children. 
The second factor, according to James, is the size of 
the community. James, 767 P.2d at 552. To this end, defendant 
merely cites the population of Box Elder County and Brigham City, 
noting the population is less than the population of Cache County 
from where the James case arose. Jld. at 553. However, the James 
Court did more than note Cache County's population. "[N]ot only 
are we concerned with a small city and a small county, but during 
the month and one-half the child was missing, there was a 
widespread community effort to help locate the missing child." 
Id. The Court focused not only on the size of the city and 
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A. DEFENDANT HAS NO STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE 
SEIZED EVIDENCE. 
A review of the evidence introduced at trial shows that 
eight trial exhibits were seized from inside trailer #3: the 
tennis shoes, the hip waders, the wrench, the blood stained box, 
the Puma bag, the pink bag, a shirt inside the pink bag, and the 
knife (T2. 189, 215-16, 222-23, 225-26, 229-30, 241-42, 244-45). 
Defendant has not claimed a possessory or privacy interest in any 
of these items. M[T]he proponent of a motion to suppress has the 
burden of establishing that his own Fourth Amendment rights were 
violated by the challenged search or seizure." Rakas, 439 U.S. 
at 131 n.l. This Court has interpreted Rakas to provide standing 
for a defendant who "can establish a legitimate expectation of 
privacy in the area searched." State v. DeAlo, 748 P.2d 194, 196 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987). Defendant has not established a legitimate 
expectation of privacy in the area searched or the items seized. 
At the suppression hearing, the State raised and argued the issue 
of standing4 (S. 3-4, 103, 106). See Marshall, 791 P.2d at 885 
(standing must be raised by prosecution below or issue waived). 
Judge Gunnell specifically found that co-defendant Brown did not 
have an expectation of privacy in the common areas of trailer #3 
(S. 117) (See Appendix "A"; oral findings). Because the officers 
were lawfully present in the common area of the trailer at the 
request of defendant and the other occupants, defendant had no 
4 
The motion to suppress was argued by co-defendant Brown's 
counsel. However, defendant filed a motion to suppress identical 
to Brown's and merely represented that his argument would be 
identical to Brown's and that the lower court's ruling on Brown's 
motion would be adopted as a ruling on his motion (S. 3). 
Defendant did not testify at the suppression hearing. 
_ i f t -
James/ a change of venue is not warranted. Unlike James, 
judicial economy will not be served by reversing defendant's 
conviction on this point and remanding for a new trial. Icl. at 
556. 
POINT II 
THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE. 
Defendant next contends that the lower court erred in 
failing to suppress certain evidence seized by Box Elder County 
Sheriff's deputies from trailer #3. Defendant lacks standing to 
challenge many, if not all, of the items. In any event, the 
items were properly seized in plain view. 
The United States Supreme Court has held that absent a 
recognized exception to the warrant requirement, warrantless 
searches are per se unreasonable. Katz v. United States, 389 
U.S. 347/ 357 (1967). See State in re K.K.C., 636 P.2d 1044, 
1046 (Utah 1981); State v. Holmes, 774 P.2d 506f 510 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989). However, a person challenging a search must have 
standing to do so. Rakas v. Illinois/ 439 U.S. 128, 138-50 
(1974). See State v. Constantinof 732 P.2d 125, 126-27 (Utah 
1987); State v. Valdez, 689 P.2d 1334, 1335 (Utah 1984); State v. 
Marshall/ 791 P.2d 880, 885 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Items seized 
in "plain view" are admissible as a recognized exception to the 
warrant requirement. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730/ 737-39 (1983) 
(plurality opinion); Coolidge v. New Hampshire/ 403 U.S. 443/ 465 
(1971) (plurality opinion). See State v. Schlosser/ 774 P.2d 
1132/ 1136 (Utah 1989); State v. Harris, 671 P.2d 175/ 177-78 
(Utah 1983); Holmes, 71A P.2d at 510. 
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standing to challenge the officers entry into the common areas. 
Neither has defendant met his burden to establish a privacy 
expectation in any of the items seized. Noticeably absent from 
defendant's brief is any claim that he had a privacy interest in 
any of the items seized. Defendant is not entitled to suppress 
evidence by vicariously asserting another person's right to 
privacy. See State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 80 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990). 
B. ALL ITEMS WERE SEIZED IN PLAIN VIEW. 
Assuming defendant has standing to challenge the 
seizure, the deputies seized all eight exhibits from trailer #3 
after viewing them from lawful vantage points. As the United 
States Supreme Court explained, "The question whether property in 
plain view may be seized . . . must turn on the legality of the 
intrusion that enables them to perceive and physically seize the 
property in question." Brown, 460 U.S. at 737. This Court has 
endorsed a three step requirement to validate a seizure under the 
plain view doctrine; 1) lawful presence of the officer; 2) 
evidence in plain view; and 3) incriminating nature of the 
evidence. Holmes, 774 P.2d at 510. The Brown court noted that 
"[i]f, while lawfully engaged in an activity in a particular 
place, police officers perceive a suspicious object, they may 
seize it immediately." Brown, 460 U.S. at 739. The Utah Supreme 
Court has held that lawful vantage points include the front door 
of homes. Harris, 671 P.2d at 179. 
In the present case, Yeates testified that he saw the 
tennis shoes, hip waders, and the cardboard box from outside the 
trailer (S. 75-76). Later, he saw the wrench when he entered the 
trailer to retrieve defendant's hay fever medicine (S. 76). When 
Yeates entered the trailer to retrieve the previously viewed 
items, he saw the pink sack, the knife, and the Puma bag (S. 81-
82, 84). Since Yeates viewed the incriminating items while being 
lawfully present in the trailer, he could legally seize them. 
See State v. Kelly, 718 P.2d 385, 390 (Utah 1986) (citing Brown, 
460 U.S. at 737). 
All items seized were clearly incriminating. The 
tennis shoes, hip waders, cardboard box, and Puma bag all had 
signs of blood on them (S. 75,-76, 78-79, 84). The dispatcher 
had informed Yeates that knives and wrenches were* involved in the 
murder (S. 80). The wrench and pink bag were both wet, although 
other items in the trailer were dry (S. 76, 80, 81). Since 
Yeates was investigating Ramirez's bloody death, there was 
probable cause to believe that any items which might have blood 
on them were evidence of the crime. Likewise, the incriminating 
nature of the knife and wrench, given the dispatcher's report, 
supported a probability that they were evidence of the crime. 
Finally, the wet condition of the wrench and the pink bag could 
logically imply someone was attempting to wash away incriminating 
aspects of the items. 
POINT III 
THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED THE 
EVIDENCE AGAINST DEFENDANT. 
Defendant next contends that the trial court improperly 
admitted evidence against him. Defendant's claim should fail. 
A. DEFENDANT DID NOT PRESERVE THE ISSUE FOR APPEAL. 
Prior to trial, defendant made a "Motion in Limine to 
Exclude Prejudicial Evidence" (R. 248-50) (See Appendix B; 
Motion). He simply made a general request that the trial court 
"review all photographs and physical evidence prior to it's [sic] 
introduction to the jury, determine it's [sic] relevancy and 
possible prejudicial effect." (R. 249-50). Defendant did not 
request a hearing on his motion, nor did he request a ruling. 
Consequently, the record is silent on any ruling on defendant's 
motion. 
Under Rule 103, Utah Rules of Evidence, a defendant 
must do more than simply file a pretrial motion to suppress. 
Rule 103 states in part: 
(a) Effect of erroneous ruling. Error may 
not be predicated upon a ruling which admits 
or excludes evidence unless a substantial 
right of the party is affected, and 
(1) Objection. In case the ruling is 
one admitting evidence, a timely objection or 
motion to strike appears of record, stating 
the specific ground of objection, if the 
specific ground was not apparent from the 
context[.] 
Utah R. Evid. 103. Significantly, defendant did not object at 
trial to a single piece of evidence. According to the Utah 
Supreme Court, a pretrial motion is preserved on appeal where the 
same judge presides at trial and the record indicates an 
evidentiary hearing was held. State v. Johnson, 748 P.2d 1069, 
1071 (Utah 1987). See also, State v. Griffin, 754 P.2d 965, 967 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988). Since no pretrial evidentiary hearing was 
held and defendant did not object at trial, defendant did not 
preserve this issue on appeal. 
B. IN ANY EVENT, DEFENDANT FAILS TO IDENTIFY THE 
OBJECTIONABLE EXHIBITS OR ESTABLISH THEIR 
PREJUDICIAL EFFECT. 
At trial, the State introduced both physical items and 
photographs as part of its case in chief. Defendant did not 
5 
object to any of these items at trial. On appeal, defendant 
contends these items were designed to prejudice him. He 
concludes that the lower court committed reversible error by 
admitting these items. Yet, even on appeal, defendant does not 
identify which exhibits he complains of. 
Relevant evidence may be excluded pursuant to Rule 403, 
Utah Rules of Evidence, under the following circumstances: 
Rule 403, Exclusion of relevant evidence on 
grounds of prejudice, confusion, or waste of 
time. 
Although relevant, evidence may be 
excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of 
undue delay, waste of time, or needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence. 
Utah R. Evid. 403. The Utah Supreme Court has held, however, 
that the general rule is that "if evidence is relevant and 
competent, the mere fact it may be inflammatory does not render 
it inadmissible." State v. Danker, 599 P.2d 518, 519 (Utah 
1979). A review of the evidence in the instant case shows the 
relevancy of all the physical evidence. In all, twenty-five 
physical exhibits taken from the murder scene were admitted into 
See Point III(A), supra. 
This Court should decline to address this issue due to the lack 
of specificity by defendant. See State v. Cobb, 774 P.2d 1123, 
1125 n.l (Utah 1989)-
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evidence. This evidence was designed to help the jury "know the 
truth in order to arrive at a just verdict[.]M rd. Defendant 
has not demonstrated how this evidence was unduly prejudicial and 
aroused the jurors' passions. State v. Royball, 710 P.2d 168, 
169 (Utah 1985). 
The Utah Supreme Court has required a stricter standard 
of admissibility where the evidence to be introduced includes 
"gruesome" photographs. State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1259 
(Utah 1988), on reconsideration, 776 P.2d 631 (1989). 
Accordingly, a gruesome photograph is admissible only if its 
"essential evidentiary value" outweighs its potential for 
prejudice. State v. Cloud, 722 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah 1986); State 
v. Garcia, 663 P.2d 60, 64 (Utah 1983). The more inflammatory 
the photograph, the greater the need to establish its essential 
evidentiary value, and conversely, the greater its essential 
evidentiary value, the greater the defendant's burden to show its 
prejudicial effect. Garcia, 663 P.2d at 64. In either case, the 
decision to admit the photograph is within the sound discretion 
of the trial court and that court's decision must not be 
overturned unless an abuse of discretion is clearly established. 
Id. at 64. 
In the present case, defendant does not assert on 
appeal that the photographs were "gruesome," but instead claims 
that they were inflammatory and highly prejudicial. Neither does 
he identify the photographs or describe them beyond photographs 
of "the victim's body, blood stained clothing and other objects 
and weapons." (Brief of App. at 19). In sum, he argues that 
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upon viewing the exhibits, this Court will understand his claim. 
Because defendant failed at trial and now fails on appeal to 
specifically address which photographs and exhibits were 
objectionable and how they were prejudicial, this Court should 
not review defendant's claims. Cobb, 774 P.2d at 1125 n.l. 
POINT IV 
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO CONVICT 
DEFENDANT OF MURDER IN THE SECOND DEGREE. 
Defendant claims that the evidence was insufficient to 
convict him of murder in the second degree and that his minimal 
role deserves acquittal. Defendant's position is without merit. 
In considering a claim of insufficiency of the 
evidence, the appellate standard of review is well-settled. See 
State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985); The Booker court 
noted: 
[W]e review the evidence and all 
inferences which may reasonably be drawn from 
it in the light most favorable to the verdict 
of the jury. We reverse a jury verdict only 
when the evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently 
inconclusive or inherently improbable that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a reas 
onable doubt that the defendant committed the 
crime of which he was convicted. 
State v. Petree, Utah, 659 P.2d 443, 444 
(1983); accord State v. McCardle, Utah, 652 
P.2d 942, 945 (1982). In reviewing the 
conviction, we do not substitute our judgment 
for that of the jury. It is the exclusive 
function of the jury to weigh the evidence 
and to determine the credibility of the 
witnesses . . . State v. Lamm, Utah, 606 P.2d 
229, 231 (1980); accord State v. Linden, 
Utah, 657 P.2d 1364, 1366 (1983). So long as 
there is some evidence, including reasonabl€* 
inferences, from which such findings of all 
the requisite elements of the crime can be 
reasonably made, our inquiry stops. 
Booker, 709 P.2d at 345. 
_o^ _ 
In the instant case, defendant was convicted of murder 
in the second degree which provides as follows; 
76-5-203. Murder In the second degree. 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes murder in 
the second degree if the actor: 
• • • 
(b) intending to cause serious bodily 
harm to another, he commits an act clearly 
dangerous to human life that causes the death 
of another; [or] 
(c) acting under circumstances evidencing 
a depraved indifference to human life, he 
engages in conduct which creates a grave risk 
of death to another and thereby causes the 
death of another[.] 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (Supp. 1989). Additionally, the Utah 
statute on accomplice culpability provides: 
76-2-202. Criminal responsibility for direct 
commission of offense or conduct of another. 
Every person, acting with the mental 
state required for the commission of an 
offense who directly commits the offense, who 
solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or 
intentionally aids another person to engage 
in conduct which constitutes an offense shall 
be criminally liable as a party for such 
conduct. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (1978). 
Defendant was tried as a party to the offense on the 
alternate theories of subsections (b) and (c). In order to 
convict defendant, the jury would have to find either that: (1) 
defendant, while intending to cause serous bodily injury to Mike 
Ramirez, committed an act clearly dangerous to human life causing 
Ramirez's death; or (2) defendant, acting under circumstances 
evidencing a depraved indifference to human life, engaged in 
conduct creating a grave risk of death and causing Ramirez's 
death (R. 413); or (3) acting with the required mental state, 
_OR_ 
solicited, requested, commanded, encouraged, or intentionally 
aided others acting in accordance with (1) or (2) above in 
killing Ramirez (R. 413, 434). 
Based on the evidence presented at trial, the jury 
could have reasonable inferred defendant's guilt. The evidence 
at trial showed that defendant, along with Brown, Cabututan, and 
Cummins, barged into Ramirez's trailer without knocking (Tl. 148-
49, 150). After Brown, Cabututan, and Cummins took Ramirez out 
of the trailer, defendant stayed inside, hitting Apodaca and 
preventing Apodaca from going outside to help his friend (Tl. 
155-58, 193). A reasonable jury could conclude defendant's 
conduct aided his compatriots with their beating of Ramirez. 
At the point Brown told defendant to stop hitting 
Apodaca, defendant did so (Tl. 160). Defendant then went outside 
where he was seen standing by Ramirez's prostate body, kicking 
him (T2. 38-39, 69, 81-82). He was also seen kneeling beside 
Ramirez's upper body and a jury could reasonably infer that he 
was contributing to Ramirez's beating at that time (T2. 37, 111-
12, 133). Up to four voices were hearing saying they were going 
to kill Ramirez (T2. 106). Defendant's shoes, taken from him the 
morning of his arrest, had blood on them (T2. 217-18). A jury 
could reasonably infer that the blood came from Ramirez, even 
though the State Crime Lab could not determine whether the blood 
was human (T2. 218). Since Ramirez died of cumulative injuries, 
a reasonable jury could conclude that defendant's participation 
in the beating helped cause Ramirez's death (T2. 155. 157-58). 
Also, a reasonable jury could infer that defendant had the 
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requisite mental state for the offense and that his participation 
was sufficient to make him a party to the crime• 
Defendant argues that the eyewitness identification is 
spotty, he was intoxicated, and that he was merely present at the 
scene of a crime (Brief of App. at 24). However, defendant 
ignores the maxim that the jury is entitled to use its own 
judgment on what evidence to believe and may draw any reasonable 
inferences from that evidence. State v. Schoenfeld, 545 P.2d 
193, 195 (Utah 1975). See also State v. Lammf 606 P.2d 229, 231 
(Utah 1980); Efco Distrib., Inc. v. Perrinf 17 Utah 2d 375, 412 
P.2d 615, 618 (1966); Webb v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 9 Utah 
2d 275, 342 P.2d 1094, 1101 (1959). The basic function of the 
jury is to weigh the conflicting evidence and draw conclusions 
from it. State v. Pierce, 722 P.2d 780, 782 (Utah 1986). 
Despite testimony to the contrary, the jury could have found, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant committed murder in the 
second degree. State v. Petreef 659 P.2d 443, 445 (Utah 1983). 
POINT V 
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO 
ALLOW THE JURY TO VIEW THE CRIME SCENE. 
Defendant argues that the court erred in refusing to 
7 
let the jury view the scene of the crime. Once again, 
defendant's claim lacks merit. 
Rule 17(i), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides 
the guidelines for permitting a jury to visit a crime scene: 
Since defendant provides no legal analysis or authority for his 
claim, this Court may refuse to consider the issue. State v. 
Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984). 
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When in the opinion of the court it is proper 
for the jury to view the place in which the 
offense is alleged to have been committed, or 
in which any other material fact occurred, it 
may order them to be conducted in a body 
under the charge of an officer to the place, 
which shall be shown to them by some person 
appointed by the court for that purpose. The 
officer shall be sworn that while the jury 
are thus conducted, he will suffer no person 
other than the person so appointed to speak 
to them nor to do so himself on any subject 
connected with the trial and to return them 
into court without unnecessary delay or 0 at 
a specified time. 
The decision to allow jurors to view a crime scene lies in the 
sound discretion of the trial court and will not be overturned 
unless the trial court "palpably" abuses its discretion. See 
State v. Roedl, 107 Utah 538, 155 P.2d 741, 746 (1945). Other 
states have adopted a similar standard. State v. Mauro, 159 
Ariz. 186, 766 P.2d 59, 77 (1986); People v. Cisneros, 720 P.2d 
982, 984 (Colo. Ct. App.), cert, denied, 479 U.S. 887 (1986); 
State v. Stoudamire, 30 Wash. App. 41, 631 P.2d 1028, 1031 
(1981). 
In the instant case, defendant has not demonstrated how 
he was prejudiced by the lower court's refusal to allow the jury 
to visit the crime scene. He merely concludes that the evidence 
is weak and this would have helped the jury with their 
deliberations (Bri€*f of App. at 26-26). However, the jury had a 
diagram of the crime scene and other evidence to assist them in 
assessing the crime scene. See Mauro, 766 P.2d at 77; Cisneros, 
720 P.2d at 984. Since no abuse of discretion occurred, this 
Court should reject defendant's claim. 
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POINT VI 
IN THE ABSENCE OF LEGAL AUTHORITY OR 
ANALYSIS, THIS COURT SHOULD NOT CONSIDER 
DEFENDANT'S CLAIM THAT HE SHOULD HAVE BEEN 
PERMITTED TO VIEW THE CRIME SCENE WITH 
COUNSEL. 
In his final point on appeal, defendant claims that the 
lower court committed reversible error in not allowing him to 
accompany counsel to the scene of the crime in order to aid in 
his own defense. However, defendant has failed to supply any 
legal authority or analysis for this novel claim. Neither has 
the State been able to uncover any authority relevant to 
defendant's claim. Because defendant has not engaged in any 
legal analysis, the State urges this Court to summarily reject 
defendant's claim. State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 
1984). 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests 
this Court to affirm defendant's conviction. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /u^ Uay of December, 
1990. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
DAN R. LARSEN 
Assistant Attorney General 
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AND I JUST DON'T THINK — AND I THINK IF THE CASES ARE LOOKED 
AT, THEY SHOW THAT AN EMPLOYER CANNOT GIVE CONSENT TO SEARCH 
AN EMPLOYEE'S AREA, AND LOOK AT MOTEL, ROOMING HOUSE, BOARDING 
HOUSE TYPE, THAT CANNOT BE CONSENTED TO BY THE OWNER. NOW, 
WITH REGARD TO THE SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST, AS I RECALL, 
DEPUTY OLSEN SAW ONE ITEM WHEN HE WENT IN, AND THAT WAS THE 
WRENCH. HE DIDN'T SEE ANY OF THE OTHER ITEMS. AND HE WAS THE 
ONLY ONE THAT WENT IN TO SECURE THE AREA TO MAKE SURE NOBODY 
ELSE WAS THERE. WE'LL SUBMIT IT ON THAT BASIS, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURTi I SHARE YOUR — YOUR VIEW OF THE ANALOGY, 
I THINK MUCH LIKE A MOTEL, THE DIFFERENCE BEING I THINK A 
BOARDING HOUSE IS CLOSER, AND THEY'RE DIFFERENT, THE BOARDING 
HOUSE ANALOGY INDICATES THERE ARE COMMON AREAS. AS CONTRASTED 
WITH THE INDIVIDUAL WHO SECURED THE PREMISES, THAT THERE IS A 
GREATER EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY. I DO THINK THAT THE CONSENT 
CAN BE GIVEN BY ANYBODY TO THE COMMON AREAS OF THOSE 
BUILDINGS. I THINK THE TESTIMONY IS THAT PEOPLE CAME AND 
WENT, THE SHARED, THEY HAD COMPANY THINGS STORED IN THOSE 
AREAS THAT THEY FROM TIME TO TIME COOKED FOR EACH OTHER. AND 
I DON'T THINK THAT THE OWNER CAN GIVE AS MUCH CONSENT AS HE 
THINKS HE CAN. AND THAT IS, TO GO TO ANYTHING THAT'S LOCATED 
ON THAT PREMISES, I DON'T SHARE THAT VIEW. BUT I DO THINK HE 
CAN GIVE CONSENT TO GO INTO THE COMMON AREAS OF THE TRAILERS 
AND OTHER THINGS THAT HE OWNS OR CONTROLS THERE. EVERYBODY 
ELSE COULD. AND CERTAINLY HE COULD AS WELL. AND HE CAN GIVE 
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CONSENT FOR OTHERS TO DO THAT, IN MY JUDGMENT. WHICH I THINK 
ALLOWS HIM TO GET TO THAT POINT. I THINK THERE ARE A NUMBER 
OF BASES UNDER WHICH AT LEAST PORTIONS OF THIS SEARCH CAN BE 
SUSTAINED. FIRST OF ALL, I WOULDN'T DISCOUNT 80 RAPIDLY THE 
SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST. THE WAY THE LAW IS IN THAT REGARD 
SAYS SUBSTANTIALLY CONTEMPORARY WITH THE ARREST. NOT JUST — 
IT COULD BE BEFORE, CAN BE AFTER, AS LONG AS IT'S WITHIN THE 
RELATIVELY — THE RELATIVE TIME PERIOD OF THE ARREST. IT'S 
DIFFICULT FOR ME TO SAY THAT WITHIN A COUPLE HOURS WHEN YOU'RE 
ON THE PROBABLY MOST REMOTE AREA OF THE STATE OF UTAH AND MOST 
INACCESSIBLE AREA OF UTAH WITH ALL THAT WAS GOING ON, UNDER-
THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES, WHEN IN FACT THERE'S NO DISPUTE BUT WHAT 
THERE WAS AN ARREST. THE ONLY ARGUMENT IS, IS THERE AN HOUR, 
HOUR AND A HALF AFTER THE ARREST, CONTEMPORANEOUS. AND THE — 
I'LL READ YOU A U.S. SUPREME COURT, UNITED STATES VERSUS 
RABINOWITZ, 339 U.S. 59, DECEISIONS OF THIS COURT HAVE OFTEN 
RECOGNIZED THAT THERE IS A PERMISSIBLE AREA OF SEARCH BEYOND 
THE PERSON PROPER. IT BECAME ACCEPTED THAT THE PREMISES WHERE 
THE ARREST WAS MADE, WHICH PREMISES WERE UNDER THE CONTROL OF 
THE PERSON ARRESTED AND WHERE THE CRIME WAS BEING COMMITTED, 
WERE SUBJECT TO SEARCH WITHOUT A SEARCH WARRANT. NOW, IT 
APPEARS TO ME THAT THIS WHOLE AREA CAN BE DESCRIBED AS 
PREMISES, GIVEN THE FACT THAT THERE WERE —THERE'S BLOOD FOUND 
ALL OVER THE PLACE. THAT IF YOU'RE TALKING ABOUT IT BEING THE 
AREA UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE — OF THE DEFENDANT WHEN THE 
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CRIME OR PERSON ARRESTED WHEN THE CRIME WAS ARRESTED, YOU'VE 
ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THAT WAS HIS PRIMARY AREA OF LIVING. 
CERTAINLY, THE AREA UNDER HIS CONTROL, IT'S THE AREA FROM 
WHICH HE EXITED WHEN THE OFFICERS CAME. SO I THINK THAT 
SEARCH INCIDENT TO AN ARREST, AND I DON'T FIND THAT THE TIME 
DIFFERENTIAL BETWEEN THE TWO IS REALLY SIGNIFICANT. NOR IS 
SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST LIMITED TO PROTECTION OF THE 
OFFICERS, SEARCH UNDER THE STATUTES OF UTAH FOR EVIDENCE. AS 
LONG AS IT'S EITHER WITH A WARRANT OR FALLS WITHIN ONE OF THE 
EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULES, THAT'S YOUR EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCE RULE 
OR INCIDENT TO ARREST RULE. THE QUESTION IS, PREMISES. AND I 
CERTAINLY FIND, USING THE RABINOWITZ DEFINITION, THE TRAILER 
HOUSE WHICH IS UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE DEFENDANT AT THE TIME 
THE CRIME WAS COMMITTED IS NOT AN UNREASONABLE APPLICATION OF 
THAT. AND ANOTHER WAY SUSTAINING THAT SEARCH, AS FAR AS I' M 
CONCERNED, ARE THE EXIGENT, JUST PLAIN EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES. 
I'M NOT — I AM NOT PERSUADED THAT IT WOULD BE A REASONABLE 
THING UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES FOR THEM TO WAIT UNTIL THEY 
OBTAINED A SEARCH WARRANT. THAT'S THE DISTANCE, THIS IS A 
HOMICIDE, IT'S NOT A MINOR CASE. THERE IS EVIDENCE THAT 
DISSIPATES RAPIDLY, AND INCLUDING BLOOD. THERE ARE A NUMBER 
OF PEOPLE WHO HAVE ACCESS TO THAT PREMISES, INCLUDING OTHER 
EMPLOYEES. AND THE FACT THAT THE NEXT MORNING WHEN THE 
OFFICER WENT OUT THERE, THERE WERE OTHER EMPLOYEES ON THE SITE 
WORKING. JUST REINFORCES THE NEED TO ACT EXPEDITIOUSLY THERE. 
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THE DETERIORATING CONDITIONS, THE TESTIMONY WAS THAT I'M AWAR 
OF, AT LEAST FROM THE EARLIER TRIAL, THAT IT WAS WET, IT HAD 
BEEN RAINING, AND NOT TOO FAR AWAY HAD BEEN SNOWING, SO A 
SUBSTANTIAL DETERIORATION OF CIRCUMSTANCES, A GREAT DEAL OF 
AGITATION AND STRESS. I JUST — I FIND THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES TC 
FALL CLEARLY WITHIN THE EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES. I WILL — FOR 
PURPOSES OF THIS HEARING, I'LL ASSUME THAT THE DEFENDANT HAS 
STANDING TO RAISE THOSE QUESTIONS. I WILL NOT BASE THIS 
DECISION ON LACK OF STANDING. 
THE MORE DIFFICULT — WELL, AND FIRST OF ALL, IF HE HAS — 
IF HE'S LAWFULLY PRESENT, WHERE HE HAS A RIGHT TO BE, YOU 
DON'T EVEN HAVE TO WORRY ABOUT ANYTHING. SO THE QUESTION 
REALLY IS, IS HE LAWFULLY PRESENT EITHER — EITHER BY CONSENT, 
BY REQUEST OF THE PARTIES, SEARCH INCIDENT TO AN ARREST, OR 
EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES, I DON'T THINK AN ARGUMENT CAN BE MADE 
THAT HE WASN'T LAWFULLY IN THE — IN THE — THE OFFICER WASN'T 
LAWFULLY IN THE TRAILER HOUSE WHEN HE WENT IN TO GET SOME 
MATERIAL FOR THE DEFENDANTS AT THEIR OWN REQUEST. CERTAINLY 
THAT PUT HIM LAWFULLY THERE AT THEIR REQUEST. THE QUESTION IS 
NOW, DID HE GET INTO AN UNLAWFUL AREA AND DID HIS — DO YOU 
CHALLENGE THE FACT THAT IT WAS IN PLAIN VIEW WHEN HE WAS 
LAWFULLY THERE. I WOULD — I THINK THAT HE WAS — CERTAINLY 
HAD A PLAIN VIEW. I GET TROUBLED A LITTLE BIT BY THE FACT 
THAT THEY'RE IN AND OUT AND IN AND OUT. HOWEVER, I'M NOT SURE 
THAT THEY'RE REQUIRED TO REMOVE EVERYTHING AT ONCE UNDER THOSE 
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CIRCUMSTANCES, SORTS OF CIRCUMSTANCES WHEN THEY HAVE — WHEN 
THEY SEE IT AND LEAVE IT THERE. I DO NOT, HOWEVER, THINK THAT 
THAT ALLOWS YOU, ON THE GROUNDS OF THE ORIGINAL CONSENT BY THE 
DEFENDANTS OR ON THE EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES, TO COME BACK 
LATER. I'M TROUBLED BY THAT ONE. BUT IN THAT CASE, TOO, I 
FIND THAT THE OWNER OF THE TRAILER HOUSE IS COMPETENT TO GIVE 
CONSENT TO ENTER THE TRAILERS. NOW, I DON'T THINK HE CAN GIVE 
CONSENT TO ENTER THE PRIVATE AREAS, BUT THE TESTIMONY WAS THAT 
WAS — WAS THAT KNIFE WAS IN — CLEARLY VISIBLE. IT WAS 
LAYING ON A COUCH OR A BUNK AND HAD BEEN THERE BEFORE. WAS 
STILL THERE LATER. I THINK IF THEY HAD HAD A LOOK THROUGH A 
DRAWER AT THAT POINT, THIS IS THE SECOND DAY, TO FIND THAT 
KNIFE, IT WOULD HAVE BEEN AN UNLAWFUL SEARCH. BUT THAT WAS 
NOT THE TESTIMONY. I THINK THE SAME IS THAT THE DOORS OF THE 
TRAILERS WERE OPENED, WHICH INDICATED THE ALCOHOL. NOW, 
UNLESS I MISUNDERSTOOD THAT TESTIMONY, BUT I THINK THE 
TESTIMONY OF THE SECOND DEPUTY, WHEN HE WENT BACK, SAID THAT 
THE CUPBOARDS WERE OPEN AND HE COULD SEE THE ALCOHOL. 
MR. BUNDERSONi THAT'S THE PROFFER. 
THE COURT I SO THAT'S MY UNDERSTANDING THAT THAT WAS 
HIS TESTIMONY. SO FOR THE SAME BASIS, AND THAT IS, ON THE 
CONSENT OF THE OWNER, TO DO WHATEVER WAS NECESSARY. I STILL 
DON'T THINK WHATEVER IS NECESSARY AUTHORIZED HIM TO VIOLATE 
SOMEBODY'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, BUT I DON'T THINK THEIR 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS WERE VIOLATED BY THAT DEPUTY BEING IN 
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WHAT IS IN EFFECT A COMMON AREA. AND THAT THE OWNER AND THE 
LANDLORD OR THE EMPLOYER UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES COULD 
CONSENT TO THEM AT LEAST BEING IN THAT AREAf BUT NOT BEYOND. 
SO I THINK AS TO YOUR MOTION TO DISMISS, I DON'T KNOW 
THAT THERE WAS ANYTHING THERE THAT WAS NOT FOUND UNDER THE 
CIRCUMSTANCES, THAT I WOULD ALLOW IT UNDER THESE — UNDER THE 
FACTS OF THIS CASE. I THINK YOU'RE CORRECT ON YOUR ANALYSIS 
OF THE LAW. I JUST THINK ITS APPLICATION HERE IS NOT AS 
RESTRICTIVE AS YOU WOULD MAKE IT. 
THE COURTi THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. 
MR. BUNDERSON* THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. 
MR. WILLMOREi APPRECIATE THE COURT PERSONNEL STAYING 
LATE. 
MR. BUNDERSONi SO DO I. 
THE COURTi COURT WILL BE IN RECESS. 
***** 
APPENDIX B 
BfUGHAM DISTRICT 
Dale M. Dorius #0903 JftM 18 3 18 PH 90 
Attorney a t Law 
P.O. Box U 
Brigham City, Utah 84302 
(801) 723-5219 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR 
THE COUNTY OF BOX ELDER, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE 
Plaintiff, ) PREJUDICIAL EVIDENCE 
vs. ) 
BILLY DONALD CAYER, ) Case No. 891000061 FS 
Defendant. ) 
COMES NOW the Defendant, Billy Donald Cayer, by and 
through his attorney, Dale M. Dorius, and hereby moves the 
Court, in Limine, to exclude prejudicial information and 
evidence pursuant to Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
FACTS 
At the preliminary hearing held in the above-entitled 
matter, several graphic photographs were introduced as well as 
items of physical evidence. Defendant, pursuant to Rule 401 
and Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, hereby moves the 
Court to determine whether those photographs and/or physical 
evidence are to be considered either to be irrelevant or 
excluded based upon the grounds of prejudice, confusion or a 
waste of time. 
Rule 401 of the Utah Rules of Evidence states: 
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any 
tendency to make the existence of any fact that 
Ca»No£&2Z2££ 
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is of consequence to the determination of the 
action more probable or less probable than it 
would be without the evidence." 
The Defendant respectfully submits that Defendant does not 
deny that the victim died, and that he died of multiple blunt 
trauma injury. 
Therefore, there is no probative value to the graphic 
photographs or to certain items of physical evidence, and such 
evidence will also be presented by oral testimony of the 
various expert witnesses on behalf of the State. 
Additionally, many items that had blood on them are not 
connected either to the Defendant or directly to the victim. 
As such, they have no relevance to the charges against this 
particular Defendant. Added to this is that no witness should 
identify any item unless it has been determined prior to the 
proceedings that such item is both relevant and not prejudi-
cial • 
Furthermore, Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence 
states: 
"Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if 
its probative value is substantially outweighed 
by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of 
the issues, or misleading the- jury, or by con-
siderations of undue delay, waste of time, or 
needless presentation of cumulative evidence." 
The Defendant submits that to allow the jury to view the 
graphic photographs would only tend to inflame the jury, 
thereby creating the danger of unfair prejudice to the Defen-
dant . 
WHEREFORE, the Defendant respectfully request that the 
Court grant his Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence of 
photographs and other physical evidence which would be accumu-
lative to the testimony of the witnesses, and would create the 
danger of unfair prejudice to the Defendant. Defendant re-
spectfully requests the Court to review all photographs and 
-2-
physical evidence prior to it's introduction to the jury, 
determine it's relevancy and possible prejudicial effect. 
DATED this /fr day of January, 1990. 
mm 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I delivered a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing document to: Mr. Roger F. Baron, Deputy Box 
Elder Attorney, 45 North 100 East, Brigham City, Utah 84302. 
DATED this (£ day of January, 1990. 
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